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Foreclosure Equity Stripping:
Legal Theories and Strategies
to Attack a Growing Problem
By Prentiss Cox
oreclosure equity stripping is the classic case of kicking someone who is down.
The person perpetrating the equity strip-let's call this person the "acquirer"-
targets homeowners who are in foreclosure and have equity remaining in the
property. Promising to "save" the home for the desperate homeowner, the acquirer
offers refinancing or other assistance to "stop the foreclosure." For too many fore-
closed homeowners, these promises end when the acquirer or the acquirer's confed-
erates gain title to the property and take the homeowner's equity.
Prentiss Cox
Associate Clinical Professor of Law
University of Minnesota School of Law
190N Mondale Hall




This scenario is occurring frequently across the country as home prices have soared
in almost every market, creating substantial equity in homes and fodder for an indus-
try that preys on homeowners who are unable to pay their mortgages. For many of
these homeowners, foreclosure equity stripping completes the cycle started by
predatory lending tactics and undermines low-income homeowners' only grasp on
economic security.
In this article I offer advocates for foreclosed homeowners an analysis of legal theo-
ries and strategies to consider when confronting foreclosure equity stripping. I dis-
cuss the genesis of the problem and the different forms that foreclosure equity strip-
ping takes (I). I focus on three legal theories that lawyers representing victims
commonly use (II). And I catalog and briefly describe other statutory and common-
law theories to consider in these cases (III).
I. Foreclosure Equity-Stripping Scams
Skyrocketing housing prices and high foreclosure levels, accompanied by growth in
the subprime lending market, have exacerbated the foreclosure equity -stripping
problem. Scams generally take one of two broad forms: fraud or reconveyance trans-
actions.'
A. The Growing "Market" of Victims
That home prices have risen sharply in recent years is well known. The Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight reports that housing prices rose over 55 per-
cent in the five-year period ending September 3o, 2oo5.2 In several regions the
increase during this period has been extraordinary-more than ioo percent in
1 My description of foreclosure equity-stripping schemes in this article is based on my review of documents and interviews
from over thirty foreclosure equity-stripping transactions in Minnesota, review of dozens of complaints and decisions from
other jurisdictions, and the National Consumer Law Center report, infra n. 8
2 Off ice of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. House Price Index for the Third Quarter of 2005, at 24(Dec 1, 2005),
available at www ofheo.gov/media/pdf/3qO5hpi pdf
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California, Hawaii, and the District of
Columbia, for example.
3
Less understood is that foreclosure rates
appear to have risen while housing prices
were escalating and stayed at high levels
despite the supposed economic recovery.
In 1986, o.26 percent of homes entered
foreclosure. The rate rose steadily, exceed-
ing 0.40 percent for the first time in 1998.
It peaked at 0.46 percent in 2ooi-2oo2 and
has since remained above 0.40 percent. 4
Either trend alone would likely result in
more homeowners who are in foreclo-
sure and have substantial equity. Other
things being equal, rising home prices
would mean that any given homeowner in
foreclosure would have a greater chance
of having substantial equity, and higher
foreclosure rates would mean more peo-
ple in foreclosure at every level of equity.
Together these trends result in a larger
number of distressed foreclosed home-
owners with substantial equity and thus a
ripe and expanding market for the
unscrupulous.
Subprime lending, which has exploded
over the last decade, may be an important
component connecting these trends.
From 1994 through 2oo3, subprime
originations increased by over 9oo per-
cent and amounted to more than io per-
cent of all mortgage refinancing origina-
tions by 2004. 5The foreclosure rate for
subprime loans has been estimated at
more than ten times the rate for con-
forming loans. 6 The problem is not just
the increase in subprime loans but the
accompanying increase in the rate of
subprime foreclosures, apparently as a
result of predatory practices. As one
commentator noted:
One might expect the number of
subprime foreclosures to increase
as the overall number of sub-
prime loan originations increase.
Significantly, however, the growth
of subprime foreclosures has
substantially outstripped the
growth of subprime originations
and the speed at which subprime
loans have gone into foreclosures
has also increased dramatically.
These data suggest, at best, great
inefficiency in the subprime
mortgage underwriting process;
but, more troubling, they also
suggest that predatory terms and
practices produce these rates of
foreclosure. In Chicago, for
example, the proportion of sub-
prime mortgage originations
increased from 3% to 24%
between 1991 and 1997; during
roughly the same period, howev-
er, the subprime share of foreclo-
sures increased from 1.3% to
35.7%.7
B. Types of Foreclosure
Equity-Stripping Schemes
Foreclosure equity- stripping schemes
vary tremendously. A recent National
Consumer Law Center survey of cases and
work in this area by state attorneys gen-
eral, legal aid attorneys, and other con-
sumer attorneys cataloged wide variation
in how the acquirer obtains control of a
home and its equity. 8 The report found a
broad range of local actors perpetrating
3 1d. at 15. Florida, Nevada, and Rhode Island have seen at least a 99 percent gain and twelve other states, including all
of New England, have seen gains of at least 60 percent. In the last year alone, house prices in Arizona rose over 30 per-
cent, while eleven other states-including Idaho, Delaware, and Oregon-saw at least a 15 percent increase. Id.
4 OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, U S HOUSING MARKET
CONDITIONS-3RD QUARTER 2005 at 74 (2005).
5 ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITALISM, THE IMPACT OF PREDATORY LOAN TERMS ON SUBPRIME FORECLOSURES:
THE SPECIAL CASE OF PREPAYMENT PENALTIES AND BALLOON PAYMENTS 2 (2005), available at www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/assets/doc-
uments/foreclosurepaper.pdf.
61d.
7 Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratones of Experimentation, 57 FLORIDA L W
REVIEW 295, 344 (2005).
8 STEVE TRIPOLI & ELIZABETH RENUART, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, DREAMS FORECLOSED: THE RAMPANT HEFT OF AMERICANS' HOMES
THROUGH FORECLOSURE "RESCUE" SCAMS (2005) [hereinafter NCLC Report), available at www.consumerlaw.org/news/con-
tentForeclosureReportFinal.pdf.
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these schemes, with no national compa-
nies engaged in systemic operations.
Acquirers can easily identify homeown-
ers to solicit because the information
needed is public record. Foreclosure fil-
ings require some form of public notice.
States that require judicial foreclosure
create a courthouse file of potential tar-
gets, while nonjudicial foreclosure pro-
cedures typically require some form of
public notice, usually by advertisement.
The other necessary element of the
scheme is equity. Judicial filings or pub-
lic notices of foreclosure are likely to
include the amount of the underlying
mortgage in default and the amount
required to prevent loss of the property.
Nonforeclosing mortgagees and other
liens against the property also are mat-
ters of public record.
1. Fraud
Some rescue scams are simple fraud or
plainly deceptive trade practices, often
against vulnerable homeowners. A com-
mon transaction of this sort involves the
acquirer obtaining a warranty deed to the
property under the pretense of starting a
refinancing or other deceptive represen-
tation. The acquirer then files the deed,
transferring ownership of the property to
himself or an associate, and moves to
evict the foreclosed homeowner. A great
variety of other types of simple fraud in
this area is seen as well. The following are
three examples: 9
In State v. Home Funding Corporation Jason
and Tanya Ruddy, a St. Paul, Minnesota,
couple, owned a home worth about
$145,000 with a loan of about $8o,ooo in
foreclosure.' 0 The Minnesota attorney
general alleged that Home Funding told
the Ruddys that it would refinance the
loan, that a Home Funding representa-
tive gave the Ruddys a business card stat-
ing "loan administrator," that Home
Funding sent an appraiser to the home as
part of the refinancing, and that Home
Funding fraudulently obtained a warran-
ty deed from the Ruddys by telling them it
was paperwork to get the loan started.
Without the Ruddys' knowledge, Home
Funding transferred the property to an
associate, Mr. Johnson, for $126,ooo.
Home Funding told the Ruddys it com-
pleted the refinancing without them. The
Ruddys made a few payments to Home
Funding on what they thought was their
new loan before receiving a "rent"
demand from Johnson, whom they did
not know. Mr. Ruddy's employer helped
him research county property records,
leading to discovery of title transfers to
Home Funding and then to Johnson.
In Rowland v. Haven Properties an elderly
widow owned a home in Chicago." After
being inundated with foreclosure rescue
offers to help her -save her home," she
responded to an offer stating that she had
been "heavily screened and pre-quali-
fied!" and that the acquirer was "able to
'quickly refinanc[e] homes out of fore-
closure!"' Ms. Rowland attended what
she thought was a refinance closing and
unknowingly "sold" her house, valued at
$245,000, for a $91,500 loan. Only later
did she learn that she had allegedly
become a renter in her home at a month-
ly payment she could not afford.
In Jumper v. Hayes the plaintiff, a 68-
year- old man on dialysis, alleged fraud in
an action to clear title to his home in
Washington, D.C., and obtain damages
against multiple people." Mr. Jumper
and his wife, now deceased, had about
$s8o,ooo in equity on a home worth
about $33o,ooo. They were in foreclo-
sure when a realtor whom they trusted
advised them that they could not obtain
refinancing and should sell their home to
9 See generally Josiah Kibe, Comment: Closing the Door on Unfair Foreclosure Practices in Colorado, 74 UNIVERSITY OF
CoLORAoo LAW REVIEW 241 (2003) (offering a hypothetical example of a simple fraud equity-stripping transaction and
describing equity-stripping problem in Colorado)
10
state v Home Funding Corporation, No C4-03-7691 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dakota County filed April 28,2003) On
December 23, 2005, the state received a judgment for $1,992,652 in restitution and $2,582,763 in civil penalties I was
involved in the prosecution of this case as lead attorney for part of the litigation and as supervising attorney for the case.
11Rowland v Haven Properties, No. 05cl 957, 2005 WL 1528264 (N D III. June 24, 2005) (rejecting motion to dismiss)
1 2jumper v Hayes, No. 04-ca-6241 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Aug 2004)
Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy * March-April 2006
Foreclosure Equity Stripping
obtain the equity. Defendant Hayes then
solicited them and promised what the
Jumpers were led to believe was a $15,000
loan to bring their mortgage loan current.
Ms. Hayes had them sign a deed transfer-
ring sole ownership to her. Unknown to the
Jumpers, she used the deed to obtain first
one loan and then, four months later,
another. After another three months, Hayes
attempted to sell the house and evict Mr.
Jumper, who learned for the first time that
Hayes considered him a renter in his home.
2. Reconveyance Transactions
Reconveyance transactions are probably
more prevalent and definitely harder to
deconstruct for purposes of a lawsuit that
will give the victim relief. The essence of
these schemes is that the acquirer
obtains title to the home in foreclosure
and then "reconveys" possession and an
interest in the property back to the
homeowner, with the supposed goal of
transferring title back to the homeowner.
The acquirer ultimately either completes
the reconveyance of the title back to the
foreclosed homeowner or, probably
much more commonly, evicts the fore-
closed homeowner and sells the property.
Some simple fraud schemes may be
reconveyance transactions on paper, but
the homeowner is unaware that any title
transfer has occurred. In this subsection
I analyze the more common problem
where foreclosed homeowners under-
stand that they have entered into a deal to
transfer and then reacquire title. These
transactions vary widely in form, but the
solicitation, acquisition- reconveyance,
and dispossession-eviction phases of the
scheme often have common elements.
a. Solicitation
Acquirers introduce themselves to fore-
closed homeowners both through direct
marketing and through mortgage brokers.
(1) Acquirer Direct Marketing
If these schemes have one common charac-
teristic, it is the promise by the acquirer to
"help stop the foreclosure" and "save" the
home. Often this representation is made in
a written solicitation sent to homeown-
ers.13 Acquirers also make these claims in
newspaper advertisements, telemarketing,
and in-person solicitations of foreclosed
homeowners. A typical advertisement
reads:
"Is Your Home In Foreclosure?
We Can Help." "We Can Save Your
Property And Even Give You
Cash In Hand." "We Can Pay
Your Mortgage For One Year And
AllowYou Time to Recover." "Our
Program Requires No Down
Payment Or Up-front Cash." "We
Are The Experts And We Have
Helped Hundreds f Peple."14
A second primary marketing representa-
tion is the bogus offer of refinancing. As
described above, this representation often
is used in simple fraudulent schemes to
obtain title without the homeowners
knowing that they have sold the home. In
other cases, a false promise of refinancing
serves to lure the homeowner into a rela-
tionship with the acquirer, who then
switches the terms of the deal to a foreclo-
sure reconveyance. One such tactic
involves "running the clock." The acquirer
leads the homeowner to believe refinanc-
ing is in progress and then, near the end of
the redemption period, tells the home-
owner that the deal fell through. The
acquirer then offers the reconveyance
scheme as the only option available.
Acquirers have accompanied these prom-
ises with other representations. Acquirers
promote the notion that they have special
expertise to deal with the complex prob-
lems and anxiety created by foreclosure
and often imply that the acquirer can offer
the homeowner a variety of options for
resolving the foreclosure. One standard
letter by an acquirer stated:
We look out for your interests.
We share vital facts about foreclosure.
We can stop the foreclosure process.
We can help you restore your credit.
We can help'you save your homestead.
13 See NCLC Report, supra note 8, at 57.
14Johnson v Home Savers, No. 04-5427 (E D.NY filed Dec. 14, 2004).
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There are so many options for
you to choose from. Schedule
your no hassle just plain facts
consultation today. Let us try and
help you figure out solutions so
you can sleep at night. 15
In reality this list of options was alleged
to have narrowed to one-a reconveyance
transaction that gave the acquirer title to
the property through a sham junior
mortgage.16
Acquirers also rely on creating a sense of
urgency. Some foreclosed homeowners
face loss of the home in weeks or days as
the foreclosure redemption period
comes to an end, and thus the urgency is
real. In most cases, however, homeown-
ers have sufficient time to sell the home,
complete a loan restructuring, or evalu-
ate other options.
Acquirers also have used affinity market-
ing techniques-appeals to racial, reli-
gious, or ethnic solidarity-to build a
false sense of trust. The National
Consumer Law Center report offers an
example of a solicitation from an African
American acquirer promising all the
usual offers ("You can stop all the fore-
closure stress today. We will lend you the
money for the foreclosure ... ") and
handwritten representations that includ-
ed: "We tell you what they won't & help
you. They can't stand to see young broth-
ers doing what they do." 17
(Z) Mortgage Brokers
Acquirers also market themselves to
mortgage brokers who deal with home-
owners with subprime loans and offer a
fee for referring foreclosed homeowners.
For homeowners who are unlikely to
qualify for refinancing, the referral for
the reconveyance transaction gives the
mortgage broker an otherwise unobtain-
able fee. Acquirers also can obtain busi-
ness from mortgage brokers by paying
referral commissions in excess of the
fees the mortgage broker could earn
through a refinance. Acquirers and bro-
kers have participated jointly in the
above-described running the clock
scheme, with the broker introducing the
acquirer as a rescuer to the desperate
homeowner facing the end of the
redemption period.
b. Acquisition and Reconveyance
I use the term "acquirer" to mean a per-
son who solicits the foreclosed home-
owner, acquires title to the property, and
then reconveys some interest to the
homeowner. In fact, many foreclosure
reconveyance transactions are not so
simple; they involve intervening trans-
fers of title and other interests. And a
plethora of methods can be used to
accomplish the different interest trans-
fers, depending on the limits and obliga-
tions of state foreclosure procedures and
individual differences in the approach of
the actors. In this subsection I briefly
address: () the conveyance of title from
the foreclosed homeowner to the acquir-
er; (2) the form of the reconveyance; and
(3) other transfers of interest and actors
involved in the acquisition-recon-
veyance process.
(1) Transfer of interest to acquirer.
Transfer of title from the foreclosed
homeowner has been accomplished by
several methods, including () deed
transfer at the same time as a closing on
the reconveyance, (2) deed transfer prior
to the reconveyance, (3) creation of a
mortgage interest, and (4) creation of
another lien or judgment interest.
The easiest reconveyance transaction to
track by document trail is a closing at
which the foreclosed homeowner trans-
fers title to the acquirer and the acquirer
reconveys an interest back to the fore-
closed homeowner. More often, however,
transfer of title to the acquirer appears to
occur before the execution of any interest
back to the homeowner. In many cases,
the acquirer simply presents the fore-
15State v HJE, No. 03-cv-05554 (D Minn filed Oct. 16, 2003)
161d.
17 See NCLC Report, supra note 8, at 54-62 (examples of written solicitations).
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closed homeowner with a deed in favor of
the acquirer. The foreclosed homeowner
executes the deed; the acquirer records it
and later reconveys an interest back to the
homeowner. Even when a closing occurs, it
appears more common that the closing is
limited to the conveyance to the acquirer,
with the reconveyance transaction later
".closing" in a separate, often informal,
document signing. This "secret" second
closing often is done to avoid drawing the
attention of the mortgage lender making
the loan to the acquirer. The transaction
may violate mortgage terms such as a "due
on sale" clause.
Acquirers also have gained title by using
mortgage or judgment interests acquired
during the foreclosure procedure. Some
acquirers give (or promise) $50 or
another small amount to the homeowner
for a junior mortgage on the home, thus
enabling the acquirer to obtain title at the
end of the foreclosure redemption peri-
od. Of course, this is a risky strategy if not
carefully executed, as another junior
creditor may gain title by paying all sen-
ior lien holders. Acquirers also have
"created" judgments that allow them to
redeem and purchase existing junior
mortgages, mechanic liens, or judgments
as a means of obtaining title.
The acquirer sometimes presents the
entire transaction in the form of a written
contract with the foreclosed homeowner
outlining the responsibilities of each
party. These contracts usually specify the
fees that the acquirer will obtain at dif-
ferent points in the transaction.
(2) Reconveyance Interest
The form and terms of the reconveyance
vary as well. The two common options
that acquirers use are reconveyance by a
contract for deed and lease with a pur-
chase option.18 In most states these two
mechanisms have the advantage to the
acquirer of allowing for rapid disposses-
sion of any interest in the home on
default by the foreclosed homeowner-
The contract for deed typically can be
cancelled within a short period. The pur-
chase option of the lease is almost always
predicated on performance of the lease,
thus allowing cancellation of the pur-
chase option if the foreclosed homeown-
er fails to make a timely rent payment.
Both these options typically are struc-
tured for a fairly short period before a
balloon payment is due on the contract
for deed or the purchase option in the
lease expires.
In the typical reconveyance transaction,
the acquirer sets a repurchase price that
substantially exceeds the costs of acquir-
ing the property but is below fair market
value. The foreclosed homeowner usually
pays rent or contract for deed payments
that exceed the acquirer's monthly carry-
ing costs and almost always exceed the
monthly payments that were due under
the mortgage in foreclosure. Therefore
the acquirer can profit from monthly
payments and the excess repurchase
price should the homeowner actually
complete the terms of the reconveyance
and once again obtain title to the proper-
ty. In Palmer v. Roberts, for example, the
acquirer gave $95,000 in consideration
to obtain title to the home and then
reconveyed it to the homeowner for
$141,000, with monthly payments of over
$s,!oo-more than the homeowner's
prior mortgage amount. 19
Acquirers have on occasion structured
other forms of the reconveyance, includ-
ing life estates for elderly foreclosed
homeowners.
(3) Other Actors and Acquirer Mortgages
There also may be a transfer of title or
mortgage interest prior to the grant of a
reconveyance interest to the homeowner.
In this scheme, acquirers find investors
to whom they transfer title, either before
or after the reconveyance. In other situa-
tions the acquirer acts more like a bro-
181 use the term "contract for deed," which is synonymous with the following: installment land contract, long-term land
contract, installment sale contract, bond for deed, and land sale contract. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, MORTGAGES
§ 3.4 (1997).
19Palmer v Roberts, No. 04cv73635, 2005 WL 1631267, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 2005) (opinion and order denying
defendant's motion for dismissal and summary judgment).
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ker, bringing the foreclosed homeowner
and the investor together to complete the
entire acquisition and reconveyance. 2 0
Foreclosed homeowners often complain
that the investor is not made known to
them until the end of the process. In
some cases, the foreclosed homeowner
learns who actually took title only on
being served an eviction notice.
A critical issue in dissecting many fore-
closure reconveyance deals is the grant of
a mortgage by the acquirer (or investor).
The financing that the acquirer or
investor uses will determine when and
whether the acquirer obtains a mortgage
and the form the mortgage takes. Some
acquirers have sufficient assets, or
financing in the form of a general line of
credit, to complete the transaction with-
out putting a lien on the home. Others
have a banking relationship with a finan-
cial institution that understands that it is
investing in a foreclosure reconveyance
deal and gives the acquirer a short-term
mortgage. Some acquirers have no regu-
lar source of financing and typically
obtain mortgage refinancing at the time
of or prior to completing the recon-
veyance. Others must rely on an
investor's creditworthiness to obtain the
mortgage financing necessary to com-
plete the transaction.
Tracking the proceeds of the mortgage
financing also is important to understand
the transaction. Acquirers have obtained
"front-end" payments that create positive
cash flow for the acquirer at the beginning
of the deal. For instance, when lenders pro-
vide financing for 8o percent of the loan
value, but the foreclosed mortgage and
other liens and closing costs are less than
this amount, there are proceeds to be dis-
tributed at the closing. When the acquirer
takes a deed to the property, uses the deed
to complete the refinancing, and then later
grants a reconveyance interest to the fore-
closed homeowner, the mortgage transac-
tion is structured as a refinancing and the
acquirer takes the closing proceeds as the
new "owner." When all the transactions
(transfer of title to the acquirer, mortgage
financing in the name of the acquirer,
and reconveyance of interest to the fore-
closed homeowner) occur simultaneous-
ly at the closing, acquirers use a variety of
means to obtain some or all of the pro-
ceeds, including (1) establishing a "sale
price" to the acquirer in the amount of
existing liens against the property rather
than fair market value, (2) creating a sell-
er carryback note and mortgage (or at
least listing such on the HUD-1 (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban
Development) financing statement), (3)
assessing "fees" to obtain the proceeds,
and (4) having the foreclosed homeown-
er endorse the proceeds check to the
acquirer following the closing. There
remains the "back-end" payment when
the acquirer obtains the remaining equi-
ty in the property through eviction and
resale. 2
1
Acquirers often use the same closing
agent, title company, and mortgage bro-
ker in repeated transactions. Given the
often specious nature of some aspects of
the closing, this practice gives the acquir-
er allies in convincing the foreclosed
homeowner that the transaction is being
handled properly.
c. Dispossession-Eviction
Foreclosure reconveyance deals are
almost always straightforward equity
lending. The acquirer seldom engages in
any form of underwriting to determine if
the foreclosed homeowner has the capac-
ity to meet the obligations required to
complete the reconveyance. Not surpris-
ingly, as a result, the homeowner is often
unable to meet the terms for recon-
veyance and the acquirer takes posses-
sion of the home. In some cases, acquir-
ers design the plan to fail so that they can
take control of the property and liquidate
remaining equity.
A lease can usually be terminated more
quickly than a mortgage or even a con-
tract for deed. A default on the lease also
2 0lnvestors' participation and culpability vary widely, from full participation in the sale and structuring of the deal to vic-
timization by an acquirer who saddles them with a mortgage in excess of the property's value-and everything in
between.
2 1The grant of a mortgage by the acquirer raises, for the foreclosed homeowner's attorney, legal issues that are beyond
the scope of this article,
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allows the acquirer to terminate the pur-
chase option. A few acquirers have
attempted to make transactions look
more likely to succeed by initially placing
the rent or contract for deed payments in
escrow, although this does little to help a
foreclosed homeowner who must find
sufficient funds to complete the purchase
option or make the contract for deed bal-
loon payment in order to regain title.
In the remainder of this article I identify
and analyze legal theories that advocates can
use to protect homeowners subject to fore-
closure equity- stripping schemes and, in
particular, reconveyance transactions. I set
forth three legal claims commonly used in
foreclosure equity- stripping cases (II). I
briefly catalog other statutory and com-
mon-law theories to consider when advo-
cating for foreclosed homeowners subject
to equity stripping (III). For the sake of
reducing a hopelessly complex subject to a
manageable topic, the legal theories I pres-
ent below are for the most part predicated
on the assumption that the transaction
involves a single "acquirer" who is the pri-
mary solicitor of the foreclosed homeowner
and who takes title and completes the
scheme by a reconveyance of an interest in
the home to the foreclosed homeowner.32
II. Primary Legal Theories to
Challenge Foreclosure
Equity-Stripping Transactions
Despite growing legislative interest, as
of the end of 2oo5 only five states
(California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri,
and Mirmesota) had legislation regulating
certain purchasers of foreclosure proper-
ties or foreclosure consultants.2 3 A prac-
titioner confronted with a problem in one
of these states should determine if the law
applies in the client's situation. In any
event, three legal theories are commonly
used in foreclosure equity- stripping
cases: (s) equitable mortgage, (2) the
Home Ownership Equity Protection Act,
and (3) state laws on unfair and deceptive
acts and practices.
A. Equitable Mortgage
The doctrine of equitable mortgage
allows courts to look past the formal sale-
reconveyance documents and, in certain
circumstances, to characterize the entire
transaction as a mortgage refinancing. A
successful equitable mortgage argument
can offer several benefits to foreclosed




'"A court of equity will look to the substance
of the transaction over the form to ascertain
the intentions of the parties" in determin-
ing whether to find an equitable mort-
gage. 2 4 The parties' intent is the touch-
stone, but "specific mortgage -negating
language in conditional sale transactions"
is not dispositive of intent. 2 5 Rather, in
ascertaining whether a transaction should
be treated as an equitable mortgage, courts
have looked to a variety of other factors as
evidence of the parties' intent.
The Restatement of Property (Third) sets
forth seven factors for consideration in
determining whether a reconveyance
2 2 Even if the facts confronting the practitioner differ from this model, the legal theories likely apply in some form, albeit
with different claims against different actors. In this article I do not address at least three types of other legal problems
that often confront practitioners in foreclosure reconveyance cases. First, some foreclosed homeowners do not seek help
until they face eviction or imminent likelihood of such proceedings. This situation can raise the problem of how to assert,
in a court whose jurisdiction is limited to determining the propriety of the eviction demand, the foreclosed homeowner's
claim that the transaction should be rescinded. Second, and perhaps most important, a number of issues arise when the
acquirer or investor grants a mortgage interest as part of the financing of the transaction-an interest that often precedes
the reconveyance interest of the foreclosed homeowner. The foreclosed homeowner then confronts the problem of inval-
idating or coping with this mortgage interest. There also are concerns with fraud or breach of contract with the mort-
gagee when the acquirer reconveys an interest to the foreclosed homeowner without the mortgagee's knowledge, Third,
a recent trend is for acquirers to establish trusts to which the foreclosed homeowner transfers title and from which the
homeowner receives the reconveyance.
2 3 See infra II.A. 1
2 4Thomas C Homburger & Brian P Gallagher, To Pay or Not to Pay: Claiming Damages For Recharacterization of Sale
Leaseback Transactions Under Owner's Title Insurance Policies, 30 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE At. TRUST JOURNAL 443 (1995)
2 5 RESTATENIEtT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY MORTGAGES § 3,3 cmt d (1997).
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transaction is an equitable mortgage. 2 6
The Restatement's comments and illus-
tration make clear that foreclosure
reconveyance is exactly the type of trans-
action that falls within this doctrine and
specifically describe both sale-contract-
for-deed deals and sale -leaseback-with-
option arrangements as possible equi-
table mortgages.2?7 One commentator
recently identified fifteen factors that
courts have used in construing equitable
mortgage claims and noted that courts
were not consistent on which factors
were deemed relevant or how to weigh
them.28
Foreclosure reconveyance transactions
frequently contain the following facts
that can help establish an equitable
mortgage: (1) the acquirer's statements
that the purpose of the deal is to help the
homeowner save or stay in the home; (2)
a substantial difference between the
price of the conveyance to the acquirer
and the property's fair market value, and
a difference between the repurchase
price and market value; (3) retention by
the foreclosed homeowner not only of
possession but also of the obligations and
prerogatives of ownership, such as paying
taxes and insurance and being responsi-
ble for repairs; (4) the complexity of the
transaction coupled with a substantial
disparity in sophistication of the parties;
and (5) a prior relationship between the
homeowner and the acquirer or associat-
ed people regarding promises or
attempts at a more traditional refinance.
Several courts have found an equitable
mortgage in foreclosure reconveyance
transactions, including sale-leaseback
deals, or rejected judgment for the
defendant as a matter of law for these
transactions.? 9 In the Rowland case
described above, the court rejected
defendant's motion to dismiss the equi-
table mortgage argument despite sale
documents clearly stating that the home-
owner was selling and then leasing back
the home. In reaching this conclusion
the court particularly noted the unequal
bargaining power of the parties.
3 o
Although especially well-suited to many
foreclosure reconveyance transactions.
proving an equitable mortgage can be an
uphill battle for the seller-grantee (the
foreclosed homeowner in the context of
this article). 3' Some courts require the
seller-grantee to prove the existence of
the equitable mortgage by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 2 By contrast, under
both the Restatement and several state
statutes, the seller may use parol evi-
dence to prove the true intent of the
transaction in the face of contrary written
documents. 3
3
2 6 1d. § 3.3(b). The seven factors are (1) statements of the parties; (2) substantial disparity between the value received by
the grantor and the fair market value of the real estate at the time of conveyance; (3) terms on which the grantor may
purchase the real estate; (4) grantor's retention of possession; (5) grantor's continued payment of real estate taxes, (6)
grantor's postconveyance improvements to the real estate; and (7) nature of the parties and their relationship before and
after the conveyance. Section 3.2 of the Restatement is similar but deals with transfers of deed without the conditional
resale that is characteristic of a foreclosure reconveyance transaction.
2 71d., illus. 3-7.
28 john C. Murray, Recharactenzation Issues in Sale-Leaseback Transactions, PROBATE ANO PROPERTY, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 18-
19.
2 9 See Brown v Grant Holding, 394 F Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Minn. 2005); James v Ragin, 432 F. Supp. 887 (WD N C 1977);
Hrubyv Larsen, No 05-894, 2005 WL 1540130 (D Minn. June 30, 2005) (unpublished) (granting preliminary injunction
to homeowner); Rowland v Haven Properties Limited Liability Company, No. 05c1957, 2005 WL 1528264 (ND III. June
24, 2005) (memorandum opinion and order unpublished) (rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss); Gagne v Hoban, 159
N.W.2d 896, 899-900 (Minn. 1968) (upholding lower court finding of equitable mortgage in a farm foreclosure recon-
veyance); Smith v Potter, 406 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1981).
30 Rowland, 2005 WL 1528264, at *3-5.
3 1Murray, supra note 28, at 19.
3 2
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY- MORTGAGES § 3.3(b) (1997).
3 31d. § 3,3(a); see also Kibe, supra note 9, at 262 (collecting statutory cites)
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2. Using the Equitable Mortgage
Doctrine to Help the Foreclosed
Homeowner Recover Title
Establishing an equitable mortgage
offers the foreclosed homeowner several
benefits. The obvious and direct result
will be that the homeowner is held to
retain title and gains the right to another
foreclosure procedure. As an indirect
result, the homeowner may find it much
easier to assert a variety of other claims,
including usury and protection under
various federal and state consumer cred-
it statutes and state mortgage licensing
laws. 3 4
B. Home Ownership Equity
Protection Act
The federal high-cost loan law, the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(Hoepa), provides a useful tool in many
foreclosure equity-stripping cases. 3 5 In
most such cases, whether your client has
a Hoepa claim will depend on whether
the loan qualifies as a Hoepa loan-if it
does, proving liability typically will be
easy. Hoepa then offers powerful statuto-
ry remedies for the homeowner.
1. Qualifying as a Hoepa Loan
A Hoepa loan is "a consumer credit
transaction that is secured by the con-
sumer's principal dwelling" that meets
cost and annual-percentage -rate trig-
gers. 3 6 Below I discuss several elements
of this definition in greater detail; I also
address the requirement that the lender
be defined as a "creditor" under Hoepa.
a. "Consumer Credit"
"Consumer credit" under Hoepa means
"the right to defer payment of debt or to
incur debt and defer its payment." 3 7 A
loan is likely to be consumer credit for
Hoepa purposes if the underlying trans-
action is found to be an equitable mort-
gage or if the transaction is a recon-
veyance in which the returned interest
instrument is a contract for deed.
The "credit" definition presents more of
a concern when the repurchase part of a
reconveyance scheme is a lease with
option to purchase. Staff Commentary to
Regulation Z, however, makes clear that a
lease can be a credit sale if the consumer
"assumes the indicia of ownership." 3 8 In
many lease options with these schemes,
the consumer does exactly that-some-
times agreeing to perform all mainte-
nance, pay real estate taxes and home-
owner's insurance, or assume similar
ownership obligations.
b. "Secured by the Consumer's
Principal Dwelling"
If the foreclosed homeowner can establish
an equitable mortgage, the arrangement
obviously will qualify as a transaction
"secured by the consumer's principal
dwelling." If an equitable mortgage is not
established, or as an alternative argument
on motion, the transaction still might be
considered as securing a consumer's prin-
cipal dwelling. The language of Section
16ow(aa) of Hoepa does not require that the
credit extended be a mortgage. In particu-
lar, reconveyance deals in which the repur-
chase is through a contract for deed likely
qualify. The Staff Commentary to Section
!26.2(a)(24) of Regulation Z, which relates
to "residential mortgage loans," specifi-
cally mentions contracts for deed as a
type of loan secured by a dwelling. 3 9
Note that the definition of a 16 o2i(aa)
loan also specifically excludes "residen-
3 4 See infra III.A.4 (usury), II.B (federal consumer credit statutes including the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act
(Hoepa) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)), III.A.2 (state mortgage licensing laws), and Ill A 3 (other state consumer cred-
it statutes).
3515 US.C. § 1639 (1994) The terms of TILA, Hoepa's statutory parent, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 (1976) et seq., are woven
into many Hoepa requirements. Both laws are implemented in Regulation Z, 12 C.FR § 226 (2001), with Hoepa regula-
tions in Sections 31-32 and 34. For readers seeking a more nearly complete analysis of the basics of Hoepa and TILA, see
ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (5th ed 2003)
3615 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (1994).
3712 C.F R § 226.2(a)(12) (2001), which incorporates the term "credit" defined under 15 U.S.C § 1602(e) and 12 C.F.R
§ 226.2(a)(14) (2001).
38Regulation Z, 12 C.FR. § 226.17 (2001) Official Staff Commentary § 226 17(a)(1)-7.
3 9Official Staff Commentary § 226.2(a)(24) n.5.
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tial mortgage transactions," defined as "a
transaction in which a mortgage, deed of
trust, purchase money security interest
arising under an installment sales con-
tract, or equivalent consensual security
interest is created or retained against the
consumer's dwelling to finance the
acquisition or initial construction of such
dwelling."4' The acquirer may argue that
the reconveyance of the property includ-
ed money for "acquisition" of the home,
but the Staff Commentary specifically
rejects this notion, stating that "a trans-
action is not 'to finance the acquisition'
... if the consumer had previously pur-
chased the dwelling and acquired some
title."4 1
c. Triggers
The foreclosed homeowner also must
establish that the loan meets one of the
Hoepa triggers of 8 percent of the loan
amount in "points and fees" or an annual
percentage rate exceeding a comparable
Treasury yield by 8 percent for a first lien
loan. 4 2 In a reconveyance transaction,
this problem usually can be analyzed in
three steps.
(1) Do the repurchase charges meet either trig-
ger? Consider whether the repurchase
portion of the transaction, standing
alone, meets either trigger. As to the
annual -percentage-rate trigger, note
that the base rate for determining the
trigger is the market rate for a Treasury
security with a -comparable period of
maturity."4 3 If the repurchase is
through a contract for deed with a bal-
loon payment, or through an option to
repurchase with a time limit, then the
comparable Treasury note rate should
be for this shorter period (and thus
presumably lower).
(:) Does the unified transaction meet the
points-and-fees trigger? If the repur-
chase portion alone does not clearly
meet one of the two triggers, calculate
points and fees by considering the sale
and repurchase as one unified transac-
tion. Add all the costs from the sale and
repurchase to see if point and fees total
8 percent of the loan amount. Again, if
the transaction is an equitable mort-
gage, all costs can be aggregated
because the sale portion of the transac-
tion is construed as providing a securi-
ty interest for the repurchase "loan."
Otherwise, the argument shifts to
whether the sale costs are "points and
fees" within the meaning of Section
226.32(b). This section defines "points
and fees" to include a noninterest
"finance charge" as defined under
Section 226.4; the "finance charge"
includes "any charge payable directly
or indirectly by the consumer and
imposed directly or indirectly by the
creditor as an incident to or a condition
of the extension of credit."4 4 The costs
incurred by the foreclosed homeowner
in the sale agreement certainly would
appear to be incident to, or a condition
of, the overall transaction. 4 5
(3) Treat lost equity as a finance charge. If
the points-and-fees trigger is not
established when the sale and repur-
chase are considered components of
one transaction, determine whether
lost equity can be construed as a
finance charge. Usually the acquirer
structures the deal to capture a profit
by creating a difference between the
homeowner's "sale" price for the
property and a much higher repur-
chase price, in case the foreclosed
homeowner completes the repur-
chase. This difference arguably is a
finance charge. The definition of
finance charge in Section ?26.4
includes charges payable "indirectly"
4015 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (1994) and 12 CFR. §226.2(a)(24) (2001)
4 1Official Staff Commentary § 226.2(a)(24) n.5.




4 5See NCLC Report, supra note 8, §§ 2.5,2, 2.5.3, 3.6 4 The definition of "points and fees" is broader than the rule for
which loan charges constitutes a finance charge Cf. 12 C.FR §§ 2264, 226 32(b)(1) (2001)
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by the homeowner or imposed "indi-
rectly" by the creditor. Because the
lower sale price was a necessary predi-
cate to the repurchase part of the trans-
action, this lost equity can be held as an
indirect charge that the foreclosed
homeowner pays to repurchase the
home. Whether this amount is charac-
terized as points and fees or as "finance
charge" probably will not matter once
it is determined to be a finance charge.
In the latter case, this finance charge
amount added to existing interest pay-
ments likely will cause an annual per-
centage rate in excess of the trigger.
d. "Creditor"
Hoepa imposes requirements only on a
"creditor"-one
(A) who regularly extends consumer
credit that is subject to a finance
charge or is payable by written agree -
ment in more than 4 installments
(not including a down payment), and
(B) to whom the obligation is initial-
ly payable, either on the face of the
note or contract, or by agreement
when there is no note or contract.4
6
(W "Regularly Extends Credit"
Compared to the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), Hoepa substantially relaxes the
standards for who qualifies as a person
regularly extending credit.47 Under
Hoepa, one is a creditor if "in any 12-
month period, the person originates
more than one credit extension that is
subject to the requirements of§ z6.3g or
one or more such credit extensions
through a mortgage broker."4 8
In some cases it may be easy to determine
that the transaction was accomplished
through a traditional mortgage broker,
thus making it unnecessary to discover
any other loan transactions conducted by
the acquirer. Other cases may have
involved an intermediary between the
acquirer and the foreclosed homeowner,
but that this person acted as a mortgage
broker is less clear. Hoepa and
Regulation Z do not define "mortgage
broker." A federal district court recently
issued a preliminary injunction and
found that a person who acts to assist a
traditional refinance in the beginning of
a transaction is a broker for Hoepa pur-
poses even if the eventual transaction
takes the different form of a recon-
veyance deal. 4 9
If the transaction was not "through a
mortgage broker," the foreclosed home-
owner must meet the alternative defini-
tion: that the acquirer conducted at least
one other Hoepa transaction not through
a mortgage broker "in any 1z-month
period" or otherwise meets the general
definition of regularly extending credit
under TILA.5 ° Many acquirers do not
engage in a large number of transactions,
or at least their other transactions may be
difficult to find and classify as an exten-
sion of Hoepa credit. Conducting discov-
ery or searching public records to locate
other deals in which the acquirer took an
interest in real estate, and investigating
those transactions, may be necessary.
(2) "To Whom the Obligation Is
Initially Payable"
4615 U S.C. §§ 1635 (1995), 1639 (1994), 1640-41 (1995), 12 C.FR 226.2(a)(17). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f ) (1994).
The language referring separately to high-cost loans in the definition of "creditor" in 15 U.S. C. 1602(f) (1994) arguably
changes and loosens the two-part requirement in the former part of this subsection. This argument was expressly reject-
ed in Viernes v. Executive Mortgage Inc., 372 F Supp. 2d 576 (D. Haw. 2004).
4 7The general TILA requirements are stated in note 3 to 12 C.FR. § 226,2(a)(17): the person must have extended credit
either more than twenty-five times in the preceding (or current) calendar year or more than five times for transactions
secured by a dwelling in the preceding (or current) calendar year.
4812 C FR. § 226.2(a)(17) n.3 (2001).
4 9 Hruby v. Larsen, 2005 WL 1540130 (D. Minn. 2005). The court relied on a dictionary definition of a mortgage broker
as "[a]n individual or organization that markets mortgage loans and brings lenders and borrowers together" in reaching
its result BLAck's LAw DICTIONARY 206 (8th ed. 2004). Many states, including Minnesota, define mortgage broker in a
licensing statute, although nothing requires a court to use this definition for Hoepa purposes.
5 0 See supra note 47 The language "in any 12-month period" is broader than the temporal reference for determining
creditor status for non-Hoepa TILA loans. Whether one could successfully argue the literal translation of this provision Is
unclear -e.g., that two such Hoepa loans in a twelve-month period three years ago are sufficient to bring the iender
within the TILA definition of creditor, or if the two loans must be within the current twelve-month period
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Advocates must identify correctly the party
who is potentially liable as a creditor
under Hoepa. The definition of "creditor"
is restricted to the person "to whom the
obligation is initially payable." In particu-
lar, under Hoepa, the repurchase seller,
not the acquirer, is the proper party in a
reconveyance transaction where these two
actors are different, that is, where the
acquirer obtains title and then flips the
property to an "investor" or other person
who takes title and acts as the reseller of
the house to the foreclosed homeowner. 5 1
Once the appropriate creditor is deter-
mined, Hoepa has special assignee liabili-
ty provisions that make most assignees
also liable for all conduct and omissions of
the creditor, including but not limited to
Hoepa violations.59
2. Hoepa Liability
Unless the acquirer is sophisticated
enough to structure the transaction care-
fully, a transaction that qualifies as a
Hoepa loan likely violates Hoepa. For
foreclosed homeowners, Hoepa offers
three types of protection: (1) additional
disclosures beyond TIA requirements,
(2) prohibited loan terms, and (3) prohi-
bitions on ancillary conduct related to
the loan.53 In equity- stripping cases the
advocate should generally focus on
* the additional disclosure requirements, 5 4
" the prohibition against balloon pay-
ments within the first five years,55
" the prohibition on extending credit
without regard to the homeowner's
ability to pay the loan obligation,5 6 and
* the limits on use of proceeds to pay a
home improvement contractor.57
3. Hoepa Remedies
A Hoepa violation gives the homeowner
most of the same remedies that are avail-
able in any TILA case, including actual
damages, attorney fees, and a statutory
penalty of $?oo to $2,oo0.5 8 Hoepa pro-
vides an important remedy of "an amount
equal to the sum of all finance charges
and fees paid by the consumer, unless the
creditor demonstrates that the failure to
comply is not material."5 9 In some equi-
ty-stripping transactions, this remedy
makes it possible to recover money or
cancel indebtedness sufficient to allow
the homeowner to recover lost equity or
obtain legitimate refinancing or both. All
of these remedies are available only if the
homeowner files an action within the
restricted limitation period of one year
from the date of the violation. 6 o
The other important remedy available
under Hoepa is the right to rescind the
loan. This right is available if the creditor
violated the disclosure and limitation
requirements in Section 226.32 but not
the conduct prohibitions in Section
a26.34. 6While rescission is a powerful
remedy, rescission in foreclosure recon-
veyance transactions often presents the
51See supra I.B.2.b.3. In this situation the acquirer might be characterized as a mortgage broker for purposes of deem-
ing the investor a creditor under Hoepa.
5215 U.S.C. § 1641(d) (1994). See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 35, § 9.7.
5312 C.FR. §§ 226.32(c) (2001) (additional disclosures), 226.32(d) (loan terms), 226.34 (ancillary conduct).
5412 C.FR. §226.32(c) (2001). The face of the paperwork typically will establish whether the acquirer has complied with
these requirements.
5 5 1d. § 226.32(d)(1).
5 6/d. § 226,34(a)(4). The language of this section includes "a presumption that a creditor has violated this paragraph
(a)(4) if the creditor engages in a pattern or practice of making loans subject to section 226 32 without verifying and doc-
umenting consumers' repayment ability." Many acquirers do not engage in any form of underwriting. The "pattern and
practice" requirement may be met by showing that the acquirer does not routinely collect from foreclosed homeowners
any information about repayment ability.
5 71d. § 226.34(a)(1).
5815 U S.C. § 1640(a)(1), (2)(A), (3) (1995).
5 9/d. § 1640(a)(4).
6 01d. § 1640(e). But see RENUART & KEEST, supra note 35, § 9.6. 1.
6112 C.ER. §226.23(a)(3) n.48(2001), See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 35, § 9 5.9
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difficult issue of how to tender the bal-
ance owed on the rescinded financing.6 2
4. TILA Violations and Remedies
The attorney for the foreclosed home-
owner may also want to consider assert-
ing a TILA violation, especially if the
transaction does not qualify as a Hoepa
loan or if rescission would be a useful
remedy but is not available for the Hoepa
violation. If the foreclosed homeowner
can prove that the transaction qualifies as
a Hoepa loan, then the acquirer or other
potentially liable person is a "creditor"
for all purposes under TILA and the loan
is likely subiect to TILA disclosure
requirements. 6 3 A TILA violation gives
rise to a right of rescission with a three-
year limitations period for the rescission
claim. 6 4 If Hoepa does not apply, the
foreclosed homeowner must establish
that the acquirer (or other person "to
whom the obligation is initially payable")
meets the more difficult general TILA
definition of a creditor who "regularly
extends credit."65
C. State Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices Laws
To catalog the myriad misrepresentations
that may occur during equity-stripping
schemes is impossible. For the more bla-
tant scams, a common-law fraud or state
unfair and deceptive acts and practices
(UDAP) claim is obvious, such as when the
acquirer tells the homeowner to sign
paperwork in order to "start the refinanc-
ing," but actually obtains and records a
deed, and the homeowner is unaware of no
longer being the record owner of the
home. 6 6 In many reconveyance schemes,
however, the deception is palpable but dif-
ficult to articulate. In this section I briefly
cover (1) framing the problem, (2) com-
mon misrepresentations and deceptive
schemes, and (3) the defense of contrary
written documents.67
1. Framing the Problem
Part of an effective UDAP or common-
law fraud argument is offering a context
for why this type of real estate transaction
is unique and the deception egregious.
Many judges instinctively look only at the
face of the executed real estate docu-
ments and dismiss a fraud or UDAP
claim. Framing the circumstances of the
transaction in compelling and sympa-
thetic terms can establish that the equi-
ties lie in favor of the foreclosed home-
owner and can help overcome judicial
inclination not to look beyond the docu-
ments. Factors to consider are the fol-
lowing:
m Acquirers Targeting Homeowners with
Equity. These deals are schemes that
acquirers actively sell, not real estate
transactions the homeowner seeks out.
The acquirers usually seek out home-
owners with significant equity.
* Emotional Distress of Foreclosed or
Vulnerable Homeowners. In addition to
severe financial distress, many fore-
closed homeowners experience unusu-
al emotional distress related to the par-
ticular home. It might be a family
inheritance where the homeowners
raised or are raising their children and
fear appearing to be failures to their
children. Homeowners might be the
first in their extended family to own
property. People who are elderly, ill, or
mentally disabled have been dispro-
portionately victimized by these
schemes.
* Trust. Acquirers often consciously cre-
ate and then misuse a sense of trust to
take advantage of the homeowner. This
is especially relevant when the case
involves affinity marketing, such as
appeals based on shared faith or race.
Some acquirers also routinely tell
homeowners that they once faced fore-
6 2 See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 35, § 6.8.
6315 US.C. § 1602(f) (1994); 12 C.FR 226 2 (a) (17) n.3 (2001).
64 5 U.S.C. § 1635 (a), (f) (1995).
6 55See supra II.B. 1 d.(1).
6 6 See, e.g., Eitcher v Mid America Financial Investment Corporation, 702 N.W.2d 792, 804 (Neb 2005)
671n some jurisdictions, unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) laws do not cover real estate transactions. See
JONATHAN A SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE AcTS AND PRACTICES § 2 2 5 (6th ed 2004)
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closure and are offering the transaction
as a means of helping others facing
foreclosure.
" Complexity. These transactions are
complex even for many lawyers to
unravel. Foreclosed homeowners, may
be less sophisticated than the average
homeowner, and many are vulnerable
due to mental or physical incapacities.
* High -Pressure or Nonexistent Closing. Many
acquirers either fail to have a formal clos-
ing or conduct a closing with an affiliated
or friendly closer who supports the
acquirer's high-pressure tactics.
" Aura of Sham Transaction. There often is
something repugnant about the process
that acquirers use to complete the deal.
For example, when the acquirer gets a
deed and promptly transfers the property
to an allied "investor" for a higher price,
one can call this a "strip and flip." How
such an acquirer posed as a rescuer but
intended only to take advantage of a
distressed homeowner is worth
describing to the court. That the
acquirer learned the approach at a get-
rich-quick seminar, that the initial
introduction to the acquirer was a
hard-sell door-to-door solicitation,
that the acquirer used a sham mortgage
to take title, or that the acquirer
assumed almost no risk are all facts
that can help frame the transaction in
terms sympathetic to the homeowner.
m Negative Effects on the Community.
Taking advantage of foreclosed home-
owners can exacerbate the negative




The following misrepresentations or decep-
tive schemes have been alleged in multiple
foreclosure equity- stripping cases:
S"'Save Your Home." This type of repre-
sentation can be found false, deceptive,
or misleading when the likely conse-
quence of the scheme is that the home-
owner will lose all ownership interest
and be evicted. Some important infor-
mation to demonstrate includes the
following: (1) the acquirer engaged in
no underwriting to determine whether
the homeowner had sufficient income
to make the monthly payments; (2) the
net effect of the deal was a monthly
payment that exceeded the amount the
homeowner had previously been
unable to pay; (3) the acquirer has
business plans or other information
aimed at investors that show an inter-
est in gaining possession of the home;
(4) the number of deals the acquirer
has entered and the outcome of those
deals (e.g., few or no homeowners have
ever been able to repurchase their
homes from the acquirer); or (5) the
acquirer's alacrity in evicting a fore-
closed homeowner who is slightly
behind on payments. 6
8
* "Guaranteed Refinancing." Often the
acquirer falsely promises to the fore-
closed homeowner that the acquirer
will later provide or arrange the refi-
nancing necessary to complete a
reconveyance.
* "Running the Clock" Refinance. Acquirers
often suggest that they are arranging a
refinancing and then stall until the
homeowner has no option but to enter
into any sale-repurchase deal that is
presented at the last minute. Evidence
that may support this claim includes
instances where the acquirer (1) uses a
company name that suggests expertise
in real estate financing (e.g., Smith
Home Finance Corporation); (2)
advertises the offer of refinancing
assistance in the newspaper or in the
initial solicitation materials; (3) uses a
business card that says "loan officer,"
"loan consultant," or the like; or (4)
tells the homeowner not to talk to the
mortgage company or anyone else.
"Running -the -clock" also is a tactic
that occurs in cooperative ventures
6 8 Traditional UDAP theories would apply to this claim, but so might a "false promise" common-law claim (or a statuto-
ry claim for states with a "consumer fraud act" version of a UDAP statute). False promise can be especially appropriate
where the acquirer repeatedly makes false promises in the course of one or several transactions. See, e g., Motorola Corp.
v. Uzan, 274 F Supp. 2d 481 (SD.NY. 2003); Chedick v Nash, 151 F3d 1077, 1081 (D.C Cir. 1998) (fraud by making a
promise with lack of present intent to perform). Evidence of similar conduct can be admissible to prove intent. See
Johnson v United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1092-99 (D.C. 1996).
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between acquirers and mortgage bro-
kers who are paid for referrals. When
the acquirer offers compensation in
excess of that earned normally by a
mortgage broker, the broker has an
incentive to let the homeowner believe
that refinancing is proceeding and then
to switch to the acquirer's foreclosure
reconveyance offer when the redemp-
tion period is nearing the end and the
homeowner has little or no choice.
* "Repurchase" Really a Lease (with or
Without Option). Acquirers may repre-
sent that they will obtain refinancing
for homeowners or help homeowners
retain ownership but then turn the
homeowners into renters in their own
homes. Advocates can build a persua-
sive UDAP claim centered on the facts
that the acquirer's representations led
the homeowners to believe that they
would retain ownership and the actual
deal deprived them of ownership
(except perhaps for an option to pur-
chase). 6 9 This argument can be pre-
sented as an alternative theory to an
equitable mortgage claim that the
transaction is in substance a loan.
" Sham Mortgages. Many acquirers obtain
title to the property at the end of the
redemption period by creating a sham
mortgage, often $5o or $1oo, with the
acquirer as the mortgagee. Possible
UDAP claims related to these mort-
gages include claims that (i) the
acquirer misrepresented to the home-
owner the purpose and effect of the
mortgage (e.g., stating that "this is to
start your refinancing"); () the con-
sideration for the mortgage was never
paid; and (3) the sham mortgage was
signed along with other papers pre-
sented to the homeowner and never
identified as such or explained.
* Other Claims. Among the multitude of
other possible UDAP claims are false,
deceptive, or misleading statements
about (1) the amount of monthly pay-
ments due under a sale-repurchase (or
leaseback); (2) the acquirer's assistance
to other homeowners in foreclosure: (3)
the qualifications or certifications of the
acquirer; (4) the purpose or effect of the
documents in the transaction; (5) the
contents of the documents in the transac-
tion (e.g., blank spaces filled in by the
acquirer or a false statement that the
homeowner is not in possession of the
property); (6) the amount or uses of the
money distributed to or for the alleged
benefit of the homeowner at closing
(including false and misleading state-
ments for the purpose of inducing the
homeowner to endorse closing proceeds
to or for the benefit of the acquirer); and
(7) the amount or nature of the fees in the
transaction.
3. Oral Misrepresentations Contrary
to Written Terms
The most likely defense in foreclosure
equity-stripping cases is that the acquirer
properly obtained and is following the
terms of written contracts with the home-
owner. Oral misrepresentations can be
actionable, courts have repeatedly held,
under state UDAP statutes in the face of
contrary written representations even
when this defense operates to preclude a
common-law fraud claim. 70 The Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected this defense in a
foreclosure equity-stripping case. 7 '
Ill. Other Possible Claims Against
Parties Participating in the
Equity-Stripping Transaction
Because of the wide variations in foreclo-
sure equity- stripping schemes, the num-
ber of other possible claims is nearly
endless. Below are brief descriptions of
claims worth considering. Each has been
asserted in at least one foreclosure equi-
ty-stripping case.72
6 9A related allegation might be that the acquirer promised a repurchase option but failed to deliver the option in the actual
transaction documents or that the acquirer offered an option to repurchase but on different and less favorable terms
70 Weigand v Walser, 683 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2004), see generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 67, §§ 4 2 15 2.
4.2 15 4 (collecting cases).
7 1Eicher, 702 N.W2d at 804.
7 2Other legal theories that are not discussed in this section and may be of relevance include federal or state RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); common-law civil conspiracy; joint venture, intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, and common-law claims (some of ancient origin) related to the execution of the deed
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A. Statutory Claims
Advocates should consider five possible
statutory claims, federal and state,
depending on the facts of the case, state
law, and the client's needs.
1. State Foreclosure
Equity-Stripping Laws
Of course, consider an action under state
law if you are in a state that has a law deal-
ing expressly with foreclosure consulting
or foreclosure purchasing. Two states,
Minnesota and Maryland, recently
enacted similar laws directly addressing
the problems presented by foreclosure
equity stripping.73 These laws compre-
hensively regulate both "foreclosure
consultants' and "foreclosure pur-
chasers." A foreclosure consultant under
these laws is a person who offers services,
claims the ability to assist in stopping
foreclosure, or makes any of a variety of
similar representations.74
The foreclosure purchaser provisions of
the Minnesota and Maryland laws aim
directly at foreclosure reconveyance
schemes and define a "foreclosure pur-
chaser" as a person who engages in fore-
closure reconveyance transactions.75
Among many other requirements and
proscriptions, the laws prohibit the fore-
closure purchaser from the following:
entering transactions in which the fore-
closed homeowner does not have a "'rea-
sonable ability to pay" for the recon-
veyance; failing either to reconvey the
property or to pay the foreclosed home-
owner if proceeds from resale exceed a
certain amount; and representing that
the foreclosure purchaser is helping to
"save the house" or making substantially
similarly representations. 76
Older state statutes exist in California,
Georgia, and Missouri. Minnesota and
Missouri modeled the foreclosure-con-
sultant portions of their laws on California's
regulation of foreclosure consultants.
California also regulates "equity pur-
chasers."7 7 The California equity purchaser
statute primarily governs contract forma-
tion, but it also shifts the burden of proof in
favor of finding an equitable mortgage
whenever there is a foreclosure recon-
veyance transaction.7 8  Although its
approach is less comprehensive, Georgia
has incorporated into its state UDAP law
provisions similar to those regulating equi-
ty purchasers in California.79 Missouri, by
contrast, has a law with provisions similar
to the foreclosure consultant portion of
California law.8 o
2. Unlicensed Real Estate or
Mortgage Origination Activity
An acquirer or associated parties often lack
the real estate or mortgage originator licen-
sure required to complete the regulated
aspects of the transactions. 8 1 This unli-
censed conduct may give rise to a claim for
violation of the statute or might constitute a
per se UDAP violation. 8
If the acquirer or other defendant is
licensed, the advocate for the foreclosed
homeowner may consider the following:
(1) an action under the licensure statute
73 MINN. STAT. § 325N (2004); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-301 to 7-321 (2005). I must note here that I was substan-
tially involved in drafting and lobbying for passage of the Minnesota law.
74 MINN. STAT. § 325N01 (2004); MD CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-301(b) (2005).
7 5
MINN STAT. § 325N.10, subdiv. 4 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-301(e) (2005).
7 6 MINN. STAT, §§ 325N.1 7(a)(a), (b), (d)(3) (2004); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-31 1(b)(1)(i), (b)(2), (b)(4)(iii) (2005).
7 7
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2945-2945.11 (foreclosure consultants), 1695-1695.17 (equity purchasers) (2005).
78 CAL, CIV. CODE § 1695.12 (2005).
7 9GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(b)(20)(A) (2005),
8 0 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407,935-.943 (2005).
8 1Ann Morales Olazabal, Redefining Realtor Relationships And Responsibilities. The Failure of State Regulatory
Responses, 40 HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION 65 (Winter 2003) (noting that every state had a real estate licensing scheme
by the end of the 1970s),
8 2 See, eg., Seligman v First National Investment Incorporated, 540 N E.2d 1057, 1064 (111, App 3d Div. 1989) See gen-
erally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 67, § 3 2,
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or for a per se UDAP violation based on
violation of the prohibitions or required
conduct in the statute; (2) reporting the
conduct to the licensing regulator; or (3)
determining if a recovery fund exists
through which to satisf any judgment
obtained in the action. t
3, Credit Services and
Credit Repair Legislation
Acquirers often represent that their
"services" or proposed actions help
improve or at least avoid further deterio-
ration in the homeowner's credit rating.
Such claims may be actionable under the
federal Credit Repair Organizations Act
or state credit services statutes. 8 4 An
advantage of these laws is the generally
substantial remedies and lengthy limita-
tion periods. 8 5
4. Usury
States typically allow regulated lenders to
charge a variety of rates, depending on
the lender and the nature of the transac-
tions.8 6 Most states also have some form
of general usury law, although the laws
vary tremendously in scope. 8 7 These
general usury statutes often cap rates at
much lower levels than they allow regu-
lated lenders to charge. In Minnesota, for
example, the general usury statute caps
interest rates as low as 6 percent com-
pared to rate limits of about 2o percent or
more for most regulated lenders. 8 8 In
foreclosure equity-stripping cases, many
acquirers are not licensed lenders and
thus may be subject to the stricter rate
limits of general usury laws.
8 9
5. Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act Antikickback
Acquirers often have various affiliates,
such as mortgage brokers, to whom they
make payments that could be character-
ized as compensation for referrals rather
than services. Such payments might give
rise to an antikickback claim under the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act.9' Unlike some other parts of the
statute, the antikickback provision con-
fers a private right of action.91
B. Common-Law Claims
The five common-law theories below
have been asserted in foreclosure equity-
stripping cases.
1. Unconscionability
A consistent characteristic of many fore-
closure equity-stripping deals is that even
carefully documented transactions appear
fundamentally unfair and shock the con-
science. In these circumstances, advo-
cates should consider claims of uncon-
scionability. This equitable doctrine
requires consideration of the entire
course of conduct underlying the transac-
tion, including the process by which the
parties entered into the deal and the terms
and effect of the bargain. 9 2 The doctrine
8 3 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 82.43 (2004).
8415 U.S.C. §§ 1679-1679(j) (1996); for state statutes, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4712.01-.99 (2006). For a com-
plete listing of state credit repair statutes, see ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ ET AL., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING, app. B.3 (Supp. 2005 ed.).
8515 U.S.C. § 1679g (1994) sets out credit repair remedies; these include a full refund of the greater of amounts paid or
actual damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. State credit repair laws often have a right of rescission and incor-
porate UDAP remedies. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 67, § 5.1.2.2.3. The Credit Repair Organizations Act has a five-year
limitation period; see 15 U.S.C. § 1679(i) (1996).
8 6 See generally ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT. REGULATION, PREEMPTION A D INDUSTRY ABUSES ch. 9 (3d
ed. 2005).
87Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
JOURNAL 85, 90-91 (2002) (stating that the typical elements of a usury claim are "(1) an agreement to lend money; (2) the
borrower's absolute obligation to repay with repayment not contingent on any other event or circumstance; (3) a greater
compensation for making the loan than is allowed under a usury statute or the State Constitution; and (4) an intention
to take more for the loan of the money than the law allows").
88 Compare MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (2004) and MINN. STAT. § 47.59, subdiv. 3 (2004).
89 See, e.g., Browner v District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1107 (D.C. 1988) (upholding criminal usury conviction for fore-
closure equity scam).
9012 U.S.C. § 2607 (2003).
9 11d. § 2614.
9 2 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
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has been successfully used by homeown-
ers in mortgage transactions. 93
Most courts look at unconscionable con-
duct in two parts: procedural and sub-
stantive. Procedural unconscionability
focuses on the relative bargaining power
and fairness of the bargaining process,
while substantive unconscionability
refers primarily to the reasonableness of
the ultimate terms of the contract. 9 4
Most courts require a finding of uncon-
scionability in both parts, although some
courts use a more flexible determination
based on either part or a combination of
the two. 9 5 Advocates for foreclosed
homeowners should also consider the
related doctrines of good faith and fair
dealing and contend that the agreement
is void as a violation of public policy.96
The factors that courts often use to
evaluate an unconscionability
claim include gross disparity in
the values exchanged ... ; belief by
the stronger party that there is no
reasonable probability that the
weaker party will fully perform
the contract; knowledge of the
stronger party that the weaker
party will be unable to receive sub-
stantial benefits from the contract;
knowledge of the stronger party
that the weaker party is unable
reasonably to protect his interests
by reason of physical or mental
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy
or inability to understand the lan-
guage of the agreement, or similar
factors.97
These factors obviously favor many fore-
closed homeowners who assert uncon-
scionability. In particular, more difficult
foreclosure reconveyance cases often pres-
ent the second factor listed above-that the
acquirer knows that the foreclosed home-
owner has no reasonable probability of per-
forming on the contract.
In Brantley v. Grant Holdings a federal dis-
trict court enjoined eviction of a home-
owner and found a likelihood that the
homeowner would prevail on an uncon-
scionability claim in a failed recon-
veyance deal.9 8 The court concluded:
[A] desperate, ill informed and
poorly represented owner, led to
believe she is on the brink of
homelessness, cannot be said to
have freely entered into an
agreement that was entirely one -
sided, offered her no reasonable
hope of successful performance
and at the same time deprived
her of her equitable and statuto-
ry rights of redemption. 9 9
2. Unjust Enrichment
The elements of an unjust enrichment
claim also can vary by state but generally
are "(1) at plaintiffs expense (2) defen-
9 3 Family Financial Services Incorporated v Spencer 677 A.2d 479 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) Patterson v ITT Consumer
Financial Corporation, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1659, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Williams v Aetna Financial
Company, 700 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1998); Williams v First Government Mortgage and Investors Corporation, 974 F. Supp.
17 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd in part and remanded in part by 225 F3d 738 (D.C, Cir. 2000).
94For a general discussion and starting point distinguishing the concepts of procedural and substantive unconscionabili-
ty, see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 208-33 (4th ed. 1995).
9 5 See Maxwell v Fidelity Financial Services Incorporated, 907 P2d 51, 58-59 (Ariz. 1995) ("[W]e conclude that under
A.R.S. § 47-2302, a claim of unconscionability can be established with a showing of substantive unconscionability alone,
especially in cases involving either price-cost disparity or limitation of remedies."). But see Harris v Green Tree Financial
Corporation, 183. F3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing courts generally require both procedural and substantive uncon-
soonability before upholding a claim of unconscionability); see also Anderson v. Delta Funding Corporation, 316 F Supp.
2d 554 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (finding procedural unconscionability alone insufficient to invalidate a clause on the basis of
unconscionability).
9 6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 6.2 (1997) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)). But
see Barasso v Rear Still Hill Road Limited Liability Company 81 Conn. App 798, 807 n. 5 (Conn. App. 2004). (noting that
"special defenses and counterclaims alleging a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing .. are not
equitable defenses to a mortgage foreclosure" (internal quotation marks omitted)),
9 7
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmts. c-d (1981).
9 8 Brantley v Grant Holdings, No. 03-6098 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2003) (order granting preliminary injunction)
9 9 /d. at 17.
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dant received benefit (3) under circum-
stances that would make it unjust for
defendant to retain benefit without pay-
ing for it."1 0 0 Often misunderstood,
unjust enrichment and restitution are
synonymous and constitute a legal theory
of liability, not merely a remedy. The law
of unjust enrichment is designed for sit-
uations in which a party takes a benefit
without legal right and yet the aggrieved
party has no remedy at law.1 0 1 This can
be an excellent description of the events
experienced by a homeowner in an equi-
ty- stripping case.
3. Breach of Contract
Reconveyance transactions can be based
on elaborate written contracts. Simple
breach of contract is a possible claim
especially when the acquirer has drafted
a contract specifying all the terms of the
reconveyance deal. These contracts can
be unusually complex, or just obtuse, and
this makes it more likely that the acquir-
er has committed a material breach.
Contract ambiguities, of course, will be
construed against the acquirer as drafter
of the agreement.
4. Title Claims: Declaratory
Judgment; Quiet Title;
Slander of Title; Injunctive Relief;
Constructive Trust
A foreclosed homeowner who realistical-
ly seeks to regain title to the home should
probably assert a claim that allows the
court to transfer title to the homeowner.
The appropriate claim will depend on the
facts of the case, the registration status of
the property, and state law. Filing a notice
of lispendens or other formal recording of
an adverse claim also may be appropriate
at the outset of many cases.
5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
As noted previously, acquirers have
claimed special expertise in dealing with
complex foreclosure problems and also
have attempted to elicit trust by the fore -
closed homeowners. Advocates may
establish that the acquirer's sales repre-
sentations create a fiduciary duty by the
acquirer to the foreclosed homeowner.
Foreclosure equity stripping is not new, but
it appears to be on the rise as a result of
soaring home values coupled with contin-
ued high foreclosure rates. Generalizing
about appropriate legal theories for com-
bating the problem is difficult because of
wide variations in how the schemes are
conducted. Many cases involve simple
fraud. More often, the homeowner know-
ingly enters into a transaction structured as
a foreclosure reconveyance. In these cases
the practitioner should first determine if a
state law regulates these transactions. Next
the practitioner should consider three legal
theories most commonly used in these
cases: equitable mortgage doctrine; Hoepa;
and UDAP laws. Numerous other theories
also may be useful depending on the facts of
the case and the needs of the homeowner.
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10 0 University of Colorado Foundation v American Cyanamid Company, 342 E3d 1298 (10th Cir. 2003)
10 1See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 1-4 (Discussion Draft 2000)
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